October 7 Attack & Gaza War Explained: Impact on India’s Foreign Policy (Part 3/3)

Introduction: The Attack That Shook the World

Before proceeding read Part 1 and Part 2 to understand the roots of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

On October 7, 2023, at approximately 6:30 AM, Hamas launched the most complex and deadly military operation in its history against Israel. Around 3,000 fighters breached the Gaza perimeter fence simultaneously at dozens of points, attacking Israeli military bases, kibbutzim, and the Supernova music festival near Re'im in the Negev desert. Over 1,200 Israelis were killed in a single day — the deadliest day for Jews since the Holocaust. Approximately 251 people were taken hostage into Gaza. It was a catastrophic failure of Israeli intelligence — a country that had believed its surveillance technology and fortified barriers made such an attack impossible.

But to understand October 7 only as a terrorist attack is to see only half the picture. It was also the violent culmination of decades of occupation, blockade, and dispossession. The attack emerged from sixteen years of Gaza blockade, three major Israeli military operations on Gaza between 2008 and 2021 (Cast Lead, Pillar of Defense, Guardian of the Walls), thousands of Palestinian civilian deaths, and the complete collapse of any credible path to Palestinian statehood. Context is not justification — but context is essential.

Israel's Response: Operation Swords of Iron

Israel's military response — Operation Swords of Iron — was launched immediately. Israel declared a state of war, called up 300,000 military reservists, and imposed a 'complete siege' on Gaza, cutting off electricity, water, fuel, and food. The stated objectives were the destruction of Hamas's military and governance infrastructure and the recovery of all hostages.

The scale of destruction was unprecedented in 21st-century conflict relative to the size of the territory. By the time a ceasefire came into effect on October 10, 2025, Israel had conducted tens of thousands of airstrikes on Gaza. Large portions of Gaza City, Khan Younis, Jabalia, and Rafah were reduced to rubble. The UN estimated that over 60% of all structures in Gaza were damaged or destroyed. United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) reported that 312 of its installations across Gaza were impacted by armed conflict-related incidents during the war. The conflict expanded regionally: Israel fought Hezbollah in Lebanon throughout 2024, conducting a ground invasion before a ceasefire; Israeli strikes hit Syria and Yemen; and Iran directly attacked Israel with missile and drone strikes in April and October 2024 — the first direct Iranian attacks on Israel in history.

The Humanitarian Crisis: Starvation as Policy

The human cost of Israel's military campaign in Gaza represents one of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in modern conflict. Independent estimates from the Max Planck Institute (November 2025) place total violent deaths between 1,00,000 and 1,26,000 — far exceeding the UN-verified Gaza Health Ministry count of 73,459 Palestinian deaths as of April 2026. The gap reflects deaths from starvation, disease, and infrastructure collapse that conventional counts miss.

The demographic breakdown reveals who bore the cost. OHCHR estimates 80% of Palestinian casualties were civilians, with women and children accounting for 70% of those killed inside residential buildings. Over 85% of Gaza's 2.3 million population was displaced at peak conflict.

The crisis was deepened by deliberate policy. From March 2025, Israel blocked UNRWA — Gaza's primary food, shelter, and healthcare agency — from bringing personnel and aid into the territory. By April 2025, UNRWA had exhausted all food supplies. Israel had already passed a law in October 2024 banning UNRWA from operating in territories it considers sovereign — what the UN Secretary-General called unprecedented in the history of UN humanitarian operations.

The world has never seen a UN agency banned from occupied territory by domestic legislation. The UNRWA ban is not only an attack on humanitarian aid — it is an attack on the international legal architecture that protects civilian populations in conflict.

The International Legal and Diplomatic Response

ICJ: South Africa's Genocide Case

In January 2024, South Africa filed an application at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) under the Genocide Convention, accusing Israel of committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza. In its preliminary ruling in January 2024, the ICJ did not dismiss the case — a significant legal finding — and ordered Israel to take immediate measures to prevent genocidal acts and ensure humanitarian assistance. Proceedings before the ICJ continue.

ICC: Arrest Warrants for Netanyahu

In November 2024, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, citing alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity in Gaza. The ICC also issued warrants for Hamas leaders. ICC member states are legally obligated under the Rome Statute to arrest subjects of ICC warrants if they travel to their territory — meaning Netanyahu cannot travel to most of Europe or other ICC member countries without risk of arrest. Israel is not an ICC member state (it has not ratified the Rome Statute), but the Court asserts jurisdiction because Palestine is a member. The USA threatened sanctions against the ICC over the warrants — reflecting the deep politicisation of international justice in this conflict.

Recognition of Palestine and UNSC Resolutions

By September 2025, a wave of new Western recognitions of the State of Palestine had occurred — the UK, Australia, Canada, Portugal, France, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, and others. The number of countries recognising Palestine now exceeds 145. The USA vetoed multiple UNSC ceasefire resolutions in 2023 and 2024. The Council eventually passed Resolution 2728 (March 2024) calling for an immediate ceasefire, and Resolution 2735 (June 2024) supporting a three-phase peace plan. A ceasefire came into effect on October 10, 2025, following extensive US-Qatar-Egypt mediation.

India and the Palestinian Question: From Nehru to Modi

India's foreign policy on Israel and Palestine spans more than seventy-five years of strategic evolution — from principled anti-colonial solidarity to pragmatic multi-track diplomacy. It is one of the most instructive case studies available for UPSC International Relations preparation.

The Nehru Era: Anti-Colonial Solidarity

Under Jawaharlal Nehru, India's position was defined by anti-colonialism. India voted against the 1947 UN Partition Plan — one of very few non-Arab nations to do so. India refused to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel after 1948. India recognised the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974, and formally recognised the State of Palestine in 1988 when the PLO declared independence. Yet beneath this public posture, pragmatic ties existed: Israel quietly provided India with intelligence support during the 1962 Sino-Indian War and military assistance during the 1965 and 1971 wars with Pakistan — decades before formal diplomatic relations were established.

The 1992 Pivot: P.V. Narasimha Rao and De-hyphenation

The decisive transformation came in January 1992, when Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao established full diplomatic relations with Israel. This came in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War's end and in the context of India's economic liberalisation. India needed Israeli defence technology, agricultural expertise, counter-terrorism intelligence, and advanced surveillance systems. This shift began India's 'de-hyphenation' policy: treating relations with Israel and the position on Palestinian statehood as two separate, parallel tracks, no longer conditioning one on the other.

The Modi Era: Strategic Embrace

Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the partnership with Israel has reached unprecedented depth. In July 2017, Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister ever to visit Israel — historically significant, and notably not balanced with a visit to the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah. Israel has become India's third-largest defence supplier, providing Heron surveillance drones, Barak missile systems, SPIKE anti-tank missiles, and Phalcon airborne early-warning systems. Intelligence cooperation, particularly in counter-terrorism, is extensive. The Kargil War of 1999 was a turning point: Israel provided emergency military supplies and intelligence to India during the conflict, cementing the relationship.

After October 7: India's Balancing Act

India's response to October 7 and the Gaza war has been a carefully calibrated test of the de-hyphenation policy under maximum pressure. India's initial statement condemned the Hamas attack and expressed solidarity with Israel — a departure from its traditional formulation. As the Gaza death toll mounted, India's position shifted incrementally: India voted in favour of multiple UN General Assembly resolutions calling for a humanitarian ceasefire and the protection of civilians. India voted for UNGA Resolution ES-10/23 (May 2024), which supported Palestinian admission to the UN as a full member state.

This balancing act reflects India's multiple, overlapping interests in West Asia:

Gulf Diaspora and Remittances: Approximately 9 million Indians work in Gulf countries — UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain. Gulf remittances are India's single largest source of remittances, exceeding US$40 billion annually. Any deterioration of India's image in the Arab world has direct economic consequences.

Energy Security: India imports approximately 40% of its crude oil from West Asian countries. Iraq is India's largest crude supplier; Saudi Arabia is second. Energy stability in West Asia is a direct national security interest.

Defence and Intelligence: Israel is a critical supplier of advanced military technology unavailable elsewhere. India cannot afford to alienate Israel on security grounds.

Multilateral Positioning: India's ambition for a permanent UN Security Council seat requires broad Global South support. Most of the Global South is sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. India cannot be seen as an unconditional Israeli ally.

Why the Two-State Solution Remains Unimplemented

The internationally endorsed solution — two independent states, Israel and Palestine, coexisting within recognised borders — has been the official position of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, the Arab League, and India for decades. Yet it has never been implemented. Understanding why is essential for UPSC analytical answers.

The obstacles are structural, political, and demographic. Over 700,000 Israeli settlers now live in the West Bank in settlements that are illegal under international law but deeply embedded in Israeli society. Any viable Palestinian state requires significant settler relocation — politically impossible for any current Israeli government. East Jerusalem, envisioned as the Palestinian capital, has been annexed by Israel. The division between Hamas-controlled Gaza and the PA-controlled West Bank means there is no unified Palestinian political leadership capable of negotiating a final agreement. And the United States — the only power with sufficient leverage to compel Israeli concessions — has consistently shielded Israel from international pressure rather than using that leverage.

There is no military solution to a political problem. Every bomb that falls is an argument for further radicalisation. Every day of occupation is a recruitment tool. The only path out is a political settlement that gives Palestinians what they have been denied for over seventy-five years: a state of their own.

INDIA AND WEST ASIA: KEY FACTS FOR UPSC

• 1947: India votes AGAINST UN Resolution 181 (Partition Plan) — one of very few non-Arab nations
• 1974: India recognises the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people
• 1988: India formally recognises the State of Palestine when PLO declared independence
• 1992: Full diplomatic relations with Israel established under PM P.V. Narasimha Rao
• 1999 (Kargil War): Israel provides emergency military supplies and intelligence to India
• 2017: PM Modi becomes first Indian PM to visit Israel; visit not balanced with stop in Ramallah
• Israel is India's 3rd-largest defence supplier | India among Israel's top arms purchasers
• Oct 2023: India expresses solidarity with Israel after Oct 7 Hamas attack
• 2024: India votes for UNGA ceasefire resolutions and Palestinian UN membership resolution
• ~9 million Indians in Gulf countries | Gulf remittances exceed US$40 billion annually
• India imports ~40% of crude oil from West Asia; Iraq and Saudi Arabia are top two suppliers

Test Your MCQ Preparation:

Question 1:

What does India's ‘de-hyphenation policy’ toward Israel and Palestine mean?

(A) Treating Israel–Palestine as a single linked issue

(B) Suspending ties with both after 1992 liberalisation

(C) Pursuing ties with Israel and support for Palestine independently

(D) Ending support for Palestinian statehood after recognising Israel

Question 2:

The full form of UNRWA is:

(A) United Nations Relief and Welfare Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East

(B) United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(C) United Nations Resettlement and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

(D) United Nations Relief and Works Authority for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East

Question 3:

Which of the following correctly describes “Operation Swords of Iron”?

(A) Hamas military campaign against Israel

(B) NATO-led intervention in West Asia

(C) UN peacekeeping mission in Gaza

(D) Israel’s military response after October 7 attack

Sample GS Mains questions:

GS Paper II — International Relations

"October 7 attack — causes, context, and consequences for regional and global order”

"India's de-hyphenation policy — what it is, its origins in 1992, and how it operates under pressure”

"India's Gulf diaspora and energy dependence as structural factors shaping West Asia policy”